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Abstract—The perception of risk is a driver for security
analysts’ decision making. However, security analysts may
have conflicting views of a risk based on personal, system
and environmental factors. This difference in perception and
opinion, may impact effective decision making. In this paper,
we propose a model that highlights areas contributing to the
perception of risk in a socio-technical environment and their
implication to system design. We validate the model through the
use of a hypothetical scenario, which is grounded in both the
literature and empirical data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Designing secure systems that people can use has become
a multi-disciplinary concern, with contributions from areas
such as Computer Security, Information Systems and Human
Computer Interaction. When considering the body of work in
this area, the literature has focused on two broad approaches:
system-centricity, and user-centricity. System-centricity fo-
cuses on the evaluation and systems requirements in regards
to usability and interfaces. User-centricity focuses on eliciting
user requirements using techniques such as contextual enquiry
and cognitive task analysis to improve the system and interface
design [36].
Despite the growing body of literature in this area, there
is a general lack of research focusing on design requirements
for decision making by security analysts. A large part of a
security analyst’s time (work) is spent on decision making
about risks (analysis and response) which have design implica-
tions crossing several areas. This encompasses user cognition,
system design and the user’s environment where the context
of the decision is derived [34]. Few decisions are made in the
absence of uncertainty and that uncertainty is a norm, not an
exception [22].
An example of perception and decision making was ob-
served in the media recently with the Microsoft Windows 10
upgrade prompt. While tradition and established beliefs dictate
that the “X” on the top-right corner of a window should close
the window and take no further action, clicking it provided
consent to the upgrade [9]. Here, the interface design was
neither too complex for the user to understand, nor were there
any features beyond the comprehension of typical Windows
users. The problem lay in misunderstandings between the
perceived model (mental model) of the system held by the
user, and the actual system model. Such situations might occur
in information security operations, where the consequences are
greater due to higher risk levels, and a more dynamic threat
environment.
To design for decision making, the user, system and en-
vironment must all be considered. To understand the role
these different elements play, this paper presents a model
of risk perception within socio-technical environments. Our
work contributes to security design by highlighting areas of a
socio-technical environment that need to be considered when
designing for decision making. We consider the related work
in design and decision making in Section II before presenting
our approach for building the model, and the model itself
in Sections III and IV respectively. We illustrate the model
using a hypothetical scenario in Section V, and discuss the
implications of our model and future work in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Complexities of Studying Decision Making
Several researchers have examined the activities of security
analysts and the decision they make. While their approaches
and interests have been different, their general goal has been
in understanding the perception security analysts have about
risk, its various guises, and how the security analysts respond
to it. The difficulties uncovering cognitive information from
participants has meant that the results obtained have not always
been conclusive.
Paul & Whitley [28] discuss the approach that security
analysts use to gain awareness of a network by using inter-
views and a card sorting exercise. The drawback of presenting
information to participants lies in the clarity and validity of
the information. For example, the card sorting exercise asks:
“Are there more or less bad guys attacking my network than
normal? What did the bad guys take?” From the exercise, we
raise the following questions:
• Who is a bad guy and how may this be defined?
• Are inside attackers classified as bad guys and how
about network anomalies that result from slips, lapses
and mistakes [7]?
• What was the security analysts perception of this during
card sorting?
Security analysts might addresses these questions differently
based on the information presented to them. Hibshi et al.
[21] describe how security analysts use steps of situation
awareness to perceive future threats and the way this aids in
identifying security requirements. They presented participants
with security artefacts from which decisions are assessed, and
comparisons were drawn between steps taken by expert and
novice security analysts. There was, however, no explanation
for why their findings show that experts do not follow all the
expected steps of situation awareness, a finding that contradicts
one of their study expectations. A possible explanation for this
is considered in the decision making models in Section II-C.
B. The Security and Usability Trade-Off in Design
Designer help bridge the gap between the system and the
user [25]. Given the fact that security and usability have
long been considered a matter of trade-off, the designers
have typically emphasised one over the other [33]. The idea
of designing for risk perceptions in security illustrates that
usability can actually be used to improve security. For ex-
ample, Cranor & Garfinkel [11] promote the need for not
treating security and usability goals as a trade-offs. Their
concern was on what an agreeable definition for this would
be. Work by Faily & Fléchais [16] attempted to address this
problem, where the activities associated with designing secure
and usable systems were their focus. They found that a large
proportion of work in security and usability focussed only
on the usability of security controls. To address this, they
developed IRIS: a framework synthesising usability, security
and requirement perspectives when specifying usable and
secure systems [16]. An alternative perspective taken by [30]
identified that improving usability of secure systems only
solves one part of the problem; there is a still a need to design
useful, usable and secure systems. For example, a security goal
should be implicit in the application goal requiring no extra
effort from the user. Of these different approaches to security
and usability, none have considered the role and implications
of decision making for security.
C. Decision Making Models
A common approach to understanding perception has been
to determine one’s situation awareness under conditions of risk
and uncertainty. Situation awareness can be explained as one’s
knowing of what is going on to determine what to do next.
There are several models used for situation awareness; these
are unrelated and have slight variations in their definition of
situation awareness but share common aspects. Azuma et al [3]
divide decision making models into two categories: Rational
and Naturalistic.
Rational models are procedural, and follow predefined or-
ders during decision making. They assume that the decision
maker will collect sufficient information and have a clear
set of options to select from. Questions are typically asked,
such as “what are the objectives” and “Compare and evaluate
the alternatives”. Two prominent examples of these are the
Observe Orient Decide Act (OODA) model [6] and Endsley’s
situation Awareness Model [15].
Naturalistic models are action based, and do not depend on
information gathering. The decision maker tries the first action
they believe to be the most suitable based on their experience
on previous incidents. If the action fails, the decision maker
notes the failure, and reacts based on the observation. A
prominent example of this is the Recognition Primed Decision
Making (RPDM) model [23]. There is no evidence that one
class of models is better than the other, but both are applicable
in certain environments.
III. APPROACH
Our study is based on a multidisciplinary literature review
that correlates the findings of research areas such as human
cognition, HCI-Security, and Human Computer Interaction.
We then collected empirical data by carrying out seven inter-
views with security analysts from two different organisations.
We analysed the transcripts from these interviews to verify
and validate our literature-based model. More detail on the
analysis and findings from this interview study will be the
subject of future work.
Our approach to the model development is inspired by End-
sley’s situation awareness [15]. We found this to be suitable
due to its focus on factors in a socio-technical environment, as
opposed to a sole focus on cognitive processes. It is important
to define the environment in which the situation in question
evolves [34].
IV. THE MODEL
The model highlights areas that contribute to the perception
of risk, and how these may be considered in system design.
The model is divided into the three domains - User, System,
and Context. Each domain consists of attributes that influence
perception in the domain.
Our approach for selecting the domains was that a domain
should be a central part that dictates the relationship of the
attributes. This reasoning led to the selection of Context as a
domain over Environment. As we illustrate in Section IV-C, it
is the Context that has a direct and transitive relationship with
the attributes of the domain and not Environment.
To illustrate the relationships and dependencies, the models
are presented as UML class diagrams [24].
A. System Domain
A System aids security analysts in achieving their goals
through task automation [27]. To do this, systems interact with
the analysts through various levels of abstraction and provides
cues to aid and improve the user’s experience [14]. A system
also provides sufficient and timely feedback to user actions.
[25].
The following are areas identified where a security analyst’s
perception may be affected as a result of system design. The
interrelationship among the System domain and its attributes
is illustrated in Figure 1.
• Automation
Security automation is defined as any system or technol-
ogy that effectively removes the security decision process
from the user [14]. The paradox of system automation
is that although it shields users from making complex
decisions through abstraction and simplifications, it also
creates complications. Over-reliance on automation may
influence user perceptions and affect decision making.
This is evident in situations where users take all auto-
mated information at face value, and lose the propensity
for analysis where false positive could be discovered.
Over dependence on automation may also lead to skill
degradation, and “out-of-the-loop unfamiliarity” [27] in-
capacitating security analysts when systems fail or are
incomprehensible. In other situations, automation is put
in place where a user is incapable; the skills gap between
the user and the systems also affects the users perception
and understanding [4].
• Interface
An interface is a medium for communication between
systems and users. As a bridge for communication, an
interface can affect user perceptions based on functional
(feedback and affordance) or non-functional (complexity
and ambiguity) aspects of its design. Examples of the two
have been described below.
– Feedback: when a user interacts with a system,
feedback is expected when actions are executing
or completed. The lack of feedback may wrongly
signify no change in state or successful execution,
impeding the user from carrying out a follow up
action or diagnosing a situation accurately. This is
known as the “gulf of evaluation” [25].
– Affordance: An affordance is the possibility of an
action on an object [18]. Originally coined by Gibson
[18], affordances exist whether a user perceives
them or not. Norman later introduced the notion
of perceived affordances [25]. These are properties
perceived to be actionable. For example, all computer
screens can afford touching but only touch-sensitive
screens will detect and respond [26]. Perceived af-
fordance would be the user’s ability to discern the
touch-sensitive capabilities of a screen. The device
must, however, be designed to hint towards this. The
lack of affordances on a device is known as the ”gulf
of execution” [25]
– Complexity: System interfaces may have many com-
ponents for user interaction and configuration such
as menus and sub-menus. As security mechanisms
grow in complexity, so does usability [5].
– Ambiguity: A system could have interface designs
with low complexity and sufficient cues, but still
present perception and usability problems. Ambigu-
ous interfaces are a result of the inappropriate,
inexplicit and inconsistent use of interface objects.
Clarity is a prerequisite for good decision making
[35].
B. User Domain
It has long been claimed that humans are the weakest link
in socio-technical environment [2]. To attend to this, systems
should be designed to be useful to both the expert and non-
expert user [10]. The understanding of cognitive shortfalls is
the first step towards solving the problem. We identify Mental
Fig. 1. System Domain
Models, Heuristics and Biases as three cognitive factors that
contribute to the perception of risk.
• Mental Models
Mental models are a human way of understanding unfa-
miliarity, and a product of ones knowledge and beliefs
[8]. Mental models may be defined as conceptual models
in peoples minds that represent their understanding of
how systems work (not limited to technical systems).
Mental models are dynamic and constantly evolve as new
knowledge is acquired [17].
Mental models may generally be grouped into two
groups. The first is task-based where the system user
has no theory on how the system functions or its
internal workings. Here the user mostly operates through
memorised sequences based on beliefs. The second is
based on knowledge of a systems workings and the
understanding of system components, processes and their
relation [8]. The designer should strive to design systems
where the second group of mental models are attainable.
Mental models can either be correct or incorrect. Poorly
conceived mental models are products of low experience,
lack of technical know-how and the factors covered in
section IV-A . Incorrect mental models that work in a
certain context of use may sometimes never be detected
if the context remains unchanged [17].
• Heuristics
Unlike the mental models, which are one’s assumptions
and beliefs of how things work, heuristics are mental
short cuts one subconsciously takes to solve problems
quickly. For example, Werlinger et al [32] report that
security analysts identify attack activity just by spotting
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) traffic on a network. IRC is
not a signal of an attack but is in this case, guilty through
association due to its popularity amongst hackers. In the
event that IRC was used by a legitimate user, the security
analysts would wrongly assume an attack was taking
place. There is a broad range of identifiable heuristics,
an area thoroughly covered by [31]. For example the
availability heuristic refers to the fact that people will
tend to think something is more likely to happen if they
can easily visualise it. This heuristic could lead security
analysts to think that the attack types they are more
familiar with through personal experience or which have
been in the news are more likely to happen, because it
is easier to visualise one of those attacks taking place.
This means they will also tend to underestimate the risk
of any attack types that they have less experience with.
The dependency on incorrect heuristics leads to what are
know as biases [1].
• Biases
Biases have many origins such as incorrect mental mod-
els, incorrect heuristics, culture and background. One
example important to system design is the framing bias.
Envision an intrusion detection system (IDS) that reports
40% of incoming traffic as malicious to one that reports
60% of incoming traffic as non-malicious. The two are
identical, but a security analyst’s interpretation of each
may be different, affecting the decision made [20]. An
alternative argument is that biases are not a problem as
such, but a necessary evil that protects us from bigger
problems. With respect to the examples above, they would
say that it is better to wrongly assume an attack is
imminent than to ignore an actual one [22].
Figure 2 illustrates the relationships between User cognitive
attributes.
Fig. 2. User Domain
C. Context Domain
The System and User domain’s focii are concerned with
perceptions particular to them. However, the Context domain
bridges the other two. Context is defined as “information that
can be used to characterise the situation of an entity”[13].
In this case, the entity is a system user. We can further
elaborate by saying that context is how a user perceives
the environment and all other interactions, and the user
has control over context. The relationship between Context
and its attributes is illustrated in Figure 3. We identify
Correlation, State, Intelligence and Environment as the factors
that contribute to the perception of risk.
1) Correlation: Correlation is one of the two system to
user relationships, based on context. We define correlation as
the requirement to perceive multiple pieces of information
from a system to create a full picture and understanding of
events. In terms of the system, this is the need to provide the
multiple pieces of information required for understanding. A
security analyst rarely relies on one piece of information to
fully understand a situation [12]. For example, the results
from a vulnerability scan indicating that vulnerabilities exist
on a system may require additional checks for false positives.
These could be verifications with patch management tools.
If a system can make provisions for the two and correlate
the data, the perception of events and decision making would
be simplified. Correlation also involves the need to perceive
competing information. For example, how will the security
analysts decide which alert to pay attention to on a busy
network? And what are the filters a system should provide to
control this? [29].
2) State: State is the second system to user relationship,
based on context. State is a system’s ability to present an
up-to-date position in time [29]. From a security analyst’s
point of view, this pertains to an ever-changing threat
landscape as new attacks and zero days are discovered.
However this does not mean systems should continuously
provide live updates to users, but that a current state should
be accessible on demand if an informed decision is to be made.
3) Intelligence: Intelligence is the composition of all
information that does not originate from a system that
helps define the context of a situation. Intelligence may
include threat alerts, zero-day discoveries, and all other threat
and vulnerability-related information. Though not from the
system, the use of intelligence helps contextualise the threat
landscape to improve the security analyst’s decision making.
We found the term “intelligence” more suitable than “threat
intelligence”, which is widely used in information security,
because the data requirements for decision making cover
more than threats alone. We also identified that the term
“information” was unsuitable based on its lack of value
in problem solving. Intelligence is an element of value
and an enabler that can be applied to problem solving.
Information, on the other hand, is processed data but may
be inapplicable to a problem [19]. From the three prominent
decision making models mentioned in Section II-C , it is only
OODA that appears to consider the use of outside information
(intelligence) for decision making.
4) Environment: An environment is where the user op-
erates; it is dynamic and shaped by external factors. The
environment is independent of the user and the system. The
user does not control the environment but the environment
influences both the user and the system.
V. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO
We now present a hypothetical scenario used to illustrate
our model. The scenario was grounded in empirical data
collected from interviews, and our review of the literature.
The scenario was validated by one of the security analysts
interviewed. Risk perception considerations from the model
identified in this scenario are highlighted in brackets.
Fig. 3. Context Domain
Sally is a security analyst for Dynamics Ltd in London,
UK. Her role is to monitor, identify and remediate threats and
vulnerabilities on her organisation’s network. Dynamics has
approximately 50 staff members, with a team of 3 in IT. The
organisation is run by Sam the managing director, who has a
secretary, Tilly.
Sally notices an unusually prolonged increase in network
traffic around midday (State). Given her 2 years in the or-
ganisation, she identifies this as an anomaly (Heuristic). Sam
is normally out for lunch at that time (Environment). Sally
monitors the logs on Dynamics’ IDS, and analyses the network
traffic on their network monitoring tool (Correlation). She
identifies that the traffic uses an RTSP protocol on port 554,
and is destined for Sams IP address. This is the connection
used for video conferencing, but the source IP address is not
from the regular connections.
A check on other logs (Correlation) shows Sam logged onto
the network two hours before his regular time. When Sam
is out for lunch, Tilly usually connects to Facebook (Envi-
ronment/Heuristic). Sally scans for Facebook traffic on Tillys
IP address and identifies that Tilly is connected to Facebook.
Given the situation, Sallys experience and her network events
expectations (Mental model), Sam is most likely out of the
office and an attack could be in progress (Possible bias). Sally
has the option to terminate the connection but she chooses
not to go with her gut feeling and seek further confirmation
by calling Tilly. Tilly confirms that Sam is in and that he had
started the day early to prepare for a video conference meeting
with their new partners in New York. The nature of the meeting
did not require Tillys assistance, so she continued her lunch
break, and interaction with social media (Intelligence).
If Sally had followed her assumption based on heuristics and
mental models, Sam meeting could have come to an abrupt
end. Had the system also not provided up to date and multiple
pieces of information, Sally would never have questioned
the scenario in the event of a real attack. Fortunately for
Dynamics, the findings of the scenario were false positives.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a model that illustrates the
contribution of different factors in a socio-technical environ-
ment to risk perception. This model highlight relationships
and dependencies between domains, and also defined context
as a novel way of modelling the relationship between a user,
system and environment.
Our work producing the model identified a broad spectrum
of work touching different research areas. We demonstrated
the importance of considering these areas in design through
the use of a common model. Unlike previous literature that
has looked at decision making in a process-oriented manner
(e.g steps of situation awareness), we followed a distributed
approach with a focus on the parts of a socio-technical
environment. In each section, we provided recommendations
or implications to design by highlight areas for consideration
when designing for decision making in an environment where
risk and uncertainty are present.
The premise behind the validation of the model using a
hypothetical scenario lies in the diverse number of possibilities
the model presents that cannot be validated in a short period
of time. This is also evident in the scenario where the systems
domain was not covered as it would have required more
characters and a longer script that would have been unrealistic.
As alluded to in Section I, the model highlights areas
leading to the perception of risk. The model highlights these
areas at a high level with perception as a first class object. A
challenge we faced in building our model was the accessibility
of security analysts, and restrictions studying their decision
making processes. As a part of future work, we will collect
additional data, and further examine each domain and their
interrelationships. This will both strengthen the validity of
our model, and identify low level principles that can establish
design requirements.
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